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Abstract
This paper proposes a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little
knowledge about the game. Through playing the identical game repeatedly, each
player not only learns which action to choose but also constructs his personal view
on the game. The model is studied using a hybrid payo® matrix of the prisoner's
dilemma and coordination games. Results of computer simulations show (1) when all
the players are slow in learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of
the game, but may enjoy higher payo®s than the cases with full or no understanding
of the game; (2) when one of the players is quick in learning the game, he obtains a
higher payo® than the others. However, all of them can receive lower payo®s than the
case where all the players are slow learners.
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1 Introduction
In standard game theory, players are assumed to have well-formed beliefs and knowledge
of the structure of the game they play. The origin of their beliefs and knowledge is
rarely studied. The validity of this assumption is, however, questioned in experimental
economics.1 According to Camerer (2003, p. 474), \what game do people think they are
playing?" is one of the top 10 most important open research question in experimental
game theory.
If players do not understand a game completely, or misunderstand it, how do they
learn about the true game? In the extensive literature, both theoretical and experimen-
tal, on learning in games, this question has been seldom addressed. The literature has
mainly focused on learning about how to play a game rather than on learning about the
game itself.2 An exception is Oechssler and Schipper (2003). They conducted a set of
experiments in which subjects did not know the payo®s of their opponent and were given
incentive to learn about them in 2 £ 2 games. The authors constructed the games that
subjects perceived they were playing|the subjective games|from the data. They found
that the subjective games di®ered frequently from the games actually being played.
In this paper, we study a model in which players play a normal form game repeatedly
and learn not only about how to play the game but also about the game itself. A normal
form game consists of the set of players, the set of available actions (or strategies), and the
payo® function for each player. Therefore, learning about a game means that players do not
know some of these components and learn about them. In this paper, we assume a player
knows about the set of actions available to himself and the number of opponents. However,
initially he does not know about the set of actions available to his opponents or anyone's
payo® functions. The player learns about them|in particular, his own payo®s associated
with possible outcomes|by playing the game repeatedly. In this paper, therefore, players
1Camerer (2003, p. 474) gives an example of a student who participated in an experiment at Caltech.
The students confused the coordination game used in the experiment with the prisoner's dilemma game,
and \defected" continuously.
2Fudenberg and Levine (1998) provided a detailed survey of the theoretical literature of learning in
games. See, for example, Crawford (1995), Cheung and Friedman (1997), Mookherjee and Sopher (1997),
Erev and Roth (1998), and Camerer and Ho (1999) for the experimental learning literature. Hanaki, Sethi,
Erev, and Peterhansl (2005) proposed a model in which players learn about which repeated game strategies
to use.
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are learning about di®erent aspects of a game than those that were studied in Oechssler
and Schipper (2003).
To model how players build their personal views about a game from playing it repeat-
edly, we have adopted an idea from cognitive science, namely, the role that autobiographical
memory plays in learning from everyday life events (Linton, 1982; Wagenaar, 1986). An
autobiographical memory is a memory of frequently repeated events. It is an abstract
script so that the details, such as the date of occurrence, are lost, and only the general
facts about the events remain. In order to replicate such a way of learning about events in
our model, players are assumed to have two types of memories, short-term and long-term
memories.3
A short-term memory is a temporary memory of an outcome of playing the game,
i.e., the actions chosen by players and the payo® received by the player.4 The short-term
memory remains in the player's mind only for a certain number of periods, and vanishes
after that. If the same outcome is repeated frequently enough while short-term memories
of it remain in the player's mind, the outcome will be kept as a long-term memory. In
other words, an outcome of the game will stay in the player's mind as a long-term memory,
if it has been experienced frequently enough during the speci¯ed periods. A long-term
memory permanently associates, in the mind of the player, an outcome of the game with
a payo®. Once an outcome of the game is engraved in the player's mind as a long-term
memory, it remains there forever, and we say that he has learned the part of the game
corresponding to it. The personal view of a player about the game is simply the part of
the game he has learned.
In addition to learning about the payo®s, players learn which action to choose. The
latter is modeled based on the reinforcement learning model. When a player does not
know any of the payo®s, only the realized payo®s will be utilized. As the player learns
some parts of the game, he starts to infer what the payo®s could have been if he had
3The model of the mind's memory system composed of short-term and long-term memories was ¯rst
proposed by James (1890) and established by Atkinson and Shi®rin (1968). Long-term memory can be
classi¯ed into episodic memory and semantic memory (Tulving, 1972). Autobiographical memory is a type
of episodic memory for information related to oneself (Brewer, 1986).
4In general, the word \memory" can mean either a storage of information or information itself. In this
paper, we mainly use \memory" in the latter sense.
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acted di®erently at least for the parts of the game he knows. Therefore, learning about
performance of actions will be based not only on the realized payo®s but also on the forgone
payo®s where possible. We have studied this model in a 3 £ 3 game that embeds both a
prisoner's dilemma and a coordination game. Through a series of computer simulations
of the model, we demonstrate what kind of personal views the players tend to form and
what kind of behavior emerges when players' personal views and their behavior coevolve.
We ¯nd that, when all the players are very slow in learning about a game, they will only
have a limited understanding (a partial view) of the game. Such a limited understanding,
however, can be bene¯cial for them. They may enjoy higher payo®s than the case of full
or no understanding of the game. Because the players enjoy high payo®s, their behaviors
do not change. Because their behaviors do not change, neither do their personal views.
Therefore, their views remain partial. When one of the players is quick in learning about
a game, he can obtain a higher payo® than the other players who are slow in learning.
However, in this case, all the players, even the fast-learning player, may obtain lower
payo®s than in the case where all the players are very slow learners.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model in de-
tail. Results of the model simulation are summarized in Section 3. Section 4 o®ers an
explanation of the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Learning about a Game
We consider a two-person game. The set of players is f1; 2g, and each player i 2 f1; 2g
has the set Si of available actions. Initially, each player only knows the set of actions that
is available to him, but he does not know the action sets of the others nor the payo®s, i.e.,
he does not know the game he is facing. Through playing the game repeatedly, players not
only learn which action will bring about higher payo®s but also form their views of the
game they are playing. Below, we ¯rst discuss how we model the formation of personal
views by players, and the representation of such views. Once we de¯ne a player's personal
view of the game, we formulate how the player learns which action to choose based on the
past outcomes and his view of the game.
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2.1 Formation of personal views
We assume that a player has two types of memories, short-term and long-term memories.
A short-term memory is a memory of an outcome of playing the game, i.e., the actions
chosen by players and the payo® received by the players. The short-term memory remains
in the player's mind only for a certain number of periods, and vanishes after that. If the
same outcome is repeated frequently enough while short-term memories of it remain in
the player's mind, it will be kept as a long-term memory. Once an outcome of the game
is engraved in the player's mind as a long-term memory, it remains there forever, and we
say that he has learned the part of the game corresponding to it.
More precisely, player i is characterized by his short-term memory length mi and
cognition threshold ki(· mi). The short-term memory length is the number of periods
before a short-term memory vanishes from his mind. The cognition threshold represents
the number of repetitions needed for an outcome to be kept as a long-term memory.
Because a short-term memory vanishes after mi periods, an outcome (si; sj) will stay in
i's mind as a long-term memory, if it has been experienced ki times in the mi most recent
interactions. Once the outcome (si; sj) is recorded as a long-term memory, the player
knows the payo® he can receive if the outcome is realized in the future.
The transformation of an outcome of the game in the mind of a player from a short-term
memory to a long-term memory in this paper plays a similar role as in the autobiographical
memory in cognitive science. The autobiographical memory is the memory of everyday life
events. As shown by Linton (1982) and Wagenaar (1986), this memory keeps a repeated
event as an abstract script. That is, when keeping such repeated events, details such
as date of occurrence are lost, and only the general facts about the events remain. In
addition, if an event is not repeated, the event will not remain as an autobiographical
memory.
In this paper, a player's personal view of the game will be de¯ned based both on the
objective payo® matrix and the set of long-term memories in his mind. Because the set of
long-term memories in the player's mind may change over time, so does his personal view
of the game.
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Let ¦ be the objective payo® matrix of the game under consideration, and let ¦i
represent the part of the payo® matrix that corresponds to what player i receives. Namely,
in a two person game,
¦i =
0BBBB@
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where ni and nj are the numbers of actions in Si and Sj , respectively, and ¼i : Si£Sj ! R
is player i's payo® function. We assume that ¼i(si; sj) 6= 0 for all si 2 Si; sj 2 Sj ; i; j 2
f1; 2g with j 6= i. This is because we assign a special meaning to value zero in the
subjective payo® matrix as de¯ned below.
Let Li(t) be the matrix that represents the state of the long-term memories in the
mind of player i at period t, where each element of the matrix takes value zero or one;
Li
si;sj
(t) 2 f0; 1g. Li
si;sj
(t) takes value zero when outcome
¡
si; sj
¢
is not in player i's mind
as a long-term memory at period t, and it is one otherwise. We assume that initially players
do not know about any of the outcomes; that is, Li
si;sj
(0) = 0 for all (si; sj) 2 Si £ Sj .
The personal view of the game for player i at period t, e¦i(t), can be de¯ned as:
e¦i(t) = Li(t) ¢¦i: (1)
Therefore, e¦i
si;sj
(t) is zero when player i has not learned of the outcome
¡
si; sj
¢
at period
t, and it is equal to ¼i(si; sj) otherwise. We call this matrix the subjective payo® matrix
for player i at period t. Now we proceed to discuss how players learn which action to
choose.
2.2 Learning about performance of actions
We assume that a player's recent experiences from choosing (as well as not choosing) an
action are summarized by his \attraction" for the action. In each period, players choose
their actions based on their attractions for each action. It is through the evolution of
attractions that players learn.
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Let Ais(t) denote player i's attraction for action s 2 Si at period t. The probability
that player i chooses action s at period t, pis(t), depends on the player's attraction as
follows:
pis(t) =
e¸
iAis(t)P
k2Si e
¸iAik(t)
: (2)
The parameter ¸i in the logistic transformation represents the extent to which actions
with higher attractions are favored in action choice. When ¸i = 0, all actions are equally
likely to be chosen regardless of their attraction. As ¸i becomes larger, actions with
higher attractions become disproportionally more likely to be chosen. In the limiting case
where ¸i !1, the action with the highest attraction is chosen with probability one. The
logistic transformation introduced here is common in the literature on learning in games
as well as experimental game theory to model better the action choices of subjects in
laboratory experiments (see, for example, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Erev and Roth,
1998; Camerer, 2003). We assume that all the actions have the same attraction for all
the players at the beginning of the game, i.e., Ais(0) = 0 for all i and s 2 Si. Therefore,
initially, all the actions are equally likely to be chosen regardless of ¸i.
Attractions evolve as follows:
Ais(t+ 1) =
1
hi
hi¡1X
¿=0
Ris(t¡ ¿); (3)
where hi = min(mi; t + 1).5 Ris(t) is a stimulus the player receives for action s at period
t, which depends on the outcome of the game as well as the player's understanding of the
game in period t in the following manner:
Ris(t) =
8>><>>:
¼i(si(t); sj(t)) if s = si(t)
e¦i
s;sj(t)
(t) otherwise,
(4)
where si(t) represents the action chosen by player i in period t. Equation (4) states that
the stimulus player i receives for action s 2 Si at t is the realized payo® when he chooses
s at period t, i.e., s = si(t), regardless of the status of long-term memories in i's mind. If
5hi = min(mi; t+1) is to take care of the early periods so that the game has not been played mi times.
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the player i does not choose s at period t, then the stimulus follows i's subjective payo®
matrix. Therefore, if the payo® consequence of (s; sj(t)) is in i's mind as a long-term
memory, then the stimulus for action s will be the forgone payo®, i.e., the payo® player i
could have obtained if he had chosen action s in period t, given the action chosen by the
opponent in that period, sj(t). Otherwise, the stimulus will be zero.
In this de¯nition of stimulus, we are assuming that once a player understands some
of the payo®s of the game, he can infer what the payo®s could have been if he had acted
di®erently for the part of the game he knows. For the parts of the game he does not know,
he cannot make such inferences.
The proposed model of learning about performance of actions builds on two models of
action learning commonly studied in the literature: learning based only on realized payo®s
(see, e.g., Erev and Roth, 1998) and learning based on both forgone and realized payo®s
(see, e.g., Camerer and Ho, 1999). The bridge between these two in our model is the long-
term memories or personal views. Indeed, when Li
si;sj
(t) = 0 for all t; (si; sj) 2 Si £ Sj ,
players in our model learn about performance of actions based only on realized payo®s.
In contrast, when Li
si;sj
(t) = 1 for all t; (si; sj) 2 Si £ Sj , players always learn based on
both realized and forgone payo®s.6 It is the dynamics of long-term memories that makes
our model di®erent from existing learning models. In the next section, we show the results
of computational simulation of our model.
3 Simulation Results
We consider symmetric 3£3 games in this paper. Each player i 2 f1; 2g has three available
actions fsi1; si2; si3g. The objective payo® matrix ¦ with a parameter a 2 (0; 0:5) is given
as follows.
6As shown by Camerer and Ho (1999), when the learning is based both on realized and forgone payo®s,
the behavior the model generates will be equivalent to the one generated by ¯ctitious play with probabilistic
action choice.
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s21 s
2
2 s
2
3
s11 1¡ a, 1¡ a 0, 1 1, 0
s12 1, 0 a, a a, 0
s13 0, 1 0, a 1¡ a, 1¡ a
As mentioned in the previous section, we have given a special meaning to the zero in
the subjective payo® matrix, the payo® consequences of outcomes that are not kept as
long-term memories. In order not to have zero in the objective payo® matrix, we added
b = 0:01 to all the payo®s.7 Note that b is not shown in the above payo® matrix for clarity
of exposition. The unique pure Nash equilibrium of this game is (s12; s
2
2) with payo® (a; a).
The game is constructed so that a prisoner's dilemma game (four cells in the upper
left corner) and a coordination game (four cells in the lower right corner) are embedded.
This is to investigate the e®ect of personal views in our model. As players learn the
game, they may see themselves facing a prisoners' dilemma-type situation, a coordination
game-type situation, or something else. Depending on how players understand the game,
their behaviors may vary. The parameter a determines the severity of the dilemma in the
prisoner's dilemma game as well as the risk{payo® trade-o® in the coordination game. In
the prisoner's dilemma game embedded here, the lower a is, the larger the aggregate loss
of not choosing (s11; s
2
1) becomes. In the embedded coordination game, if 1=3 < a < 0:5,
(s12; s
2
2) is the risk-dominant equilibrium while (s
1
3; s
2
3) is the payo®-dominant equilibrium.
It is interesting to see what kind of views players construct and what kind of behavior
they learn over time under various values of a.
In the simulation analysis below, we ¯rst focus on the cases where all the players have
the same short-term memory length, mi = m, and the same cognition threshold, ki = k.
We then proceed to the cases where players have the same short-term memory length but
di®erent cognition thresholds. Throughout the paper, we assume that the sensitivity of
action choices to the attractions are the same across players, ¸i = ¸ for all i 2 f1; 2g.
7The results remain the same if we subtract b = 0:01 from all the payo®s.
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Figure 1: The evolution of the long-term memory (top) and the corresponding frequencies
of realized outcomes (bottom) from a single simulation run. m = 5, k = 3, ¸ = 5:0,
a = 0:25. The black cells represent those outcomes recorded as long-term memories.
3.1 Case of identical memory length and threshold
We ¯rst consider the case where the short-term memory length of the players and their
cognition thresholds are identical across them. In such cases, we have four parameters in
our model: a de¯nes the payo® matrix, m and k determine the length of the players' short-
term memory and their cognition threshold, and ¸ governs the importance of attractions in
action choices. We will show results based on a particular set of parameter values (m = 5,
¸ = 5:0, a = 0:25 while varying k). The dependencies of the results on the parameter
values are discussed in the appendix.
Figure 1 shows an outcome of a simulation run.8 The parameters are set so thatm = 5,
k = 3, ¸ = 5:0, and a = 0:25. To illustrate the evolution of players' long-term memories
8A single simulation run consists of 1000 interactions by a pair of players. One period in the simulation
corresponds to one interaction by the pair of players.
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(top panel), the outcomes that are kept as long-term memories at a given point in time are
shown by the black cells. Nine cells in the objective payo® matrix are numbered from 1 to
9 as shown in the status of long-term memories at t = 0. The frequencies of realization of
each outcome of the game are represented by the height of the corresponding bars in the
bottom panel. In this simulation run, outcome 1 has been realized with a high frequency
in earlier periods. As a result, it became a long-term memory of the two players. Between
period 400 and 500, however, because of a player's deviation from playing action 1, the
players learned other outcomes. Consequently, the behaviors of the players change quite
drastically in the later periods. As one can see from the ¯gure, in the later period, outcome
5, which is the Nash equilibrium of the game, is realized with the highest frequency.
The result in Figure 1 is just an example of how the players' understanding of the
game and their behaviors coevolve as players repeatedly play the game. However, it is
not the representative result. In fact, there can be many other patterns of coevolution.
Instead of enumerating all the possible results, we focus on averaged results9 below.
Figure 2 shows the results of simulations for a = 0:25. In each ¯gure, the average
payo®s of the row-player over time (top),10 the average status of long-term memories at
t = 500 (bottom), and the average frequencies of realized outcomes for 500 · t · 1000
(middle) are shown for k = 1 (left), k = 3 (center), and k = 5 (right). Except for the
average status of the long-term memories, the outcome of the two models of learning, the
one based only on realized payo® (RL model) and the other based on both realized and
forgone payo® (FP model) are reported.11
In the top panel of the ¯gure, the outcomes from the three models are shown. The
average payo® of the row-player from the RL model (\RL players") is shown with solid
gray, and that from the FP model (\FP players") is shown with dashed gray. The result
of our model (game learning model, \GL players") is shown in solid black. The middle
panel shows, by the height of the bars, the frequencies with which outcomes corresponding
9For each set of parameter values, we take the average of the results generated by 100 simulation runs,
while giving varying random seeds for each run.
10The average payo® of the column-player is very similar to that of the row-player.
11The two models considered in this paper are those with a probabilistic action choice and ¯xed memory
length. In both of these models, actions are chosen based on the attraction following equation (2) while
the attraction evolves following equation (3) except that the status of long-term memories is modi¯ed as
discussed in the main text above.
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Average Status of Long-Term Memories at t = 500
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Figure 2: Average payo® of the row-player over time (top), average frequencies of realized
outcomes (middle), and average status of long-term memories (bottom) for various k.
m = 5, a = 0:25, ¸ = 5:0. For the average payo®, the result of our model is in solid black,
the solid gray represents the RL model, and the dashed gray represents the FP model. For
the average status in the long-term memories, the darker gray corresponds to the higher
likelihood that the outcome is kept as a long-term memory, which is also shown by the
height of bars.
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to cells numbered from 1 to 9 are realized. The FP in the ¯gure stands for the outcome
of the \FP model" while RL stands for that of the \RL model". In the bottom panel,
the darkness of a cell and the corresponding height of the bars show the proportion of the
simulation runs for which the outcome was recorded as a long-term memory at t = 500.
When k = 1, one can see that the payo® received by GL players quickly converges to
those received by FP players. When k = 1, players learn all the payo®s of the game quite
quickly. As one can see in the ¯gure, by t = 500, all the payo®s are known by the players
almost all the time.12 Once GL players learn of all the payo®s, their behaviors become
equivalent to those of FP players.
The convergence in the average payo® is much slower in the case of k = 3. In this
case, players do not learn all the payo®s as in the k = 1 case. Players learn, however,
the outcomes 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8 by t = 500 in the majority of the simulation runs. The
result shows that such a partial understanding is enough for players to choose the Nash
equilibrium action with a high probability.
Do partial understandings of the game always lead players to choose the Nash equi-
librium action with a higher likelihood? The results from the k = 5 case shows that the
answer is no. When k = 5, GL players receive higher payo®s than both RL and FP play-
ers. The partial understandings of the game that resulted in this case gives more bene¯ts
to players than the full or no understanding of the game. The ¯gure shows that players
learn outcome 1, which Pareto dominates Nash equilibrium outcome 5, in the majority of
simulation runs. While outcomes 5 and 9 are also learned, such cases are infrequent.
The result comes from both a partial view of the game and the players' limited ability
to acquire the view. As mentioned in Section 2, it is hard for GL players with high
cognition thresholds, k, to keep the outcomes as a long-term memory. Outcome 1 realized
by these players is stable once it becomes a long-term memory. This is because it is hard
for player 1 (player 2) to encounter outcome 4 (2) repeatedly enough to learn that it is
more attractive than outcome 1, which is already engraved in his mind as a long-term
memory.
It should be noted that players' action choices and their understandings of the game
12In fact, when k = 1, players understand all the payo®s by period 100 in most of the simulations.
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coevolve in our model. Therefore, not only do players bene¯t from their limited under-
standing of the game, but also, because they bene¯t from such a limited understanding,
their behaviors do not change. Therefore, their views remain partial.13
This result is quite interesting and illuminates the possibility that as we live in a very
complex society, it may not be feasible for us to learn the true or complete interactive
environment that we face. Our understanding of the environment may be very limited,
but as long as we are satis¯ed with the outcomes, we do not actively try to learn the true
environment (or do not try and see what will happen if we do something di®erent from
what we normally do). Therefore, our understandings remain limited. Of course, it is
quite possible that, because of our limited understanding and the lack of exploration, we
are not receiving a higher payo®, which could be obtainable if we really understand the
complete environment.
3.2 Case of identical memory length but di®erent thresholds
In the previous subsection, we have seen the case where players have identical short-term
memory length m and cognition threshold k. When all the players are slow in constructing
their personal view of the game (k close to m), they can obtain a higher payo® than when
they are quick in learning the game structure (small k). What happens if two players
who have the same short-term memory length m1 = m2 = m, but di®erent cognition
thresholds, interact? We consider such cases in this subsection.
Figure 3 shows the typical dynamics of long-term memory of two players and the
frequencies of realized outcomes when player 1's cognitive threshold is 1, k1 = 1, and that
of player 2 is 5, k2 = 5. Both the players have the same short-term memory length, m = 5.
The sensitivity of action choices to attractions, ¸, are set equal to 5, and the payo® matrix
is such that a = 0:25.
In this particular simulation run, both players learn outcomes 1 and 5 by period 100.
While player 2 only learns these two, player 1 learns all the outcomes except for outcome 9.
By period 500, player 1 learns all the outcomes, but player 2's understanding still remains
13The dependency of the results on parameter values are discussed in the appendix, which shows that the
result holds in quite a large parameter space as long as players' cognition thresholds, k, are high enough,
i.e., close to their short-term memory lengths, m.
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Figure 3: The evolution of the long-term memory for a player with low k, k1 = 1, (top) and
high k, k2 = 5 (middle) and the corresponding frequencies of realized outcomes (bottom)
from a single simulation run. m = 5, ¸ = 5:0, a = 0:25. The black cells represent the
outcomes that are kept as long-term memories.
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limited to outcomes 1, 4, and 5.
The dynamics of the frequencies of the realized outcomes are quite interesting. In the
¯rst 100 periods, it was outcome 1 that had been realized the most. Beyond period 100,
outcomes 4 and 5 are realized with higher frequencies than outcome 1. It should be noted
that because player 1 knows almost all the payo®s, when both players are happily choosing
action 1 (therefore outcome 1 is realized), player 1 can infer that if he chooses action 2,
while player 2 keeps choosing action 1, he can get a higher payo® (associated with outcome
4). Therefore, there is a high chance that he will change his behavior. However, if player
1 indeed chooses action 2, player 2 may think that it is better to choose action 2 instead
of action 1. (Recall that player 2 knows the payo® associated with outcome 5!) Such
learning will result in both players indeed choosing action 2, i.e., the Nash equilibrium.
This example shows that even if only one of the players is quick in learning about the
game, two players may learn to choose the actions that correspond to the Nash equilibrium
outcome. It is not necessary that both the players be quick in learning about the game to
reach the Nash equilibrium.
Figure 4 shows the averaged results14 of the simulation runs. It shows, for three di®er-
ent thresholds (k = 1; 3; 5) of player 1, average payo®s of players over time (top), average
frequencies of realized outcomes (middle), and average status of long-term memories for
two players (bottom). In these simulation runs, player 2's thresholds are ¯xed at k2 = 5.
Other parameter values are m1 = m2 = 5, a = 0:25, and ¸ = 5:0. We are presenting the
k1 = k2 = 5 case as the benchmark.
In the top panel, the average payo® of the player with a lower k, player 1, is the solid
line, while that of the player with a high k, player 2, is the dashed line. In the ¯gure,
player 1 receives a higher payo® than player 2. This is because a player who is quick
in learning about the game, and therefore better understands the game, can make more
sophisticated decisions than the other player.
However, interestingly, compared with the case where both players have a very high
cognitive threshold, k1 = k2 = 5, payo®s for both players are lower when one of the players
14As noted above, for each set of parameter values, we take the average of the results generated by 100
simulation runs, while giving varying random seeds for each run.
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Figure 4: Average payo® of the row-player over time (top), average frequencies of realized
outcomes (middle), and average status of long-term memories (bottom) for three values
of k1. m1 = m2 = 5, k2 = 5, a = 0:25, ¸ = 5:0. In the top ¯gure, the average payo® of
player 1 (low cognitive threshold) is the solid line, while that of player 2 (high cognitive
threshold) is the dashed line. For the average status in the long-term memories, the
darker gray corresponds to the higher likelihood that the outcome is kept as the long-term
memory. The same information is also shown by the height of bars.
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has a lower cognitive threshold. As seen above, the player with a low cognitive threshold,
player 1, learns almost all the outcomes while the player with a high threshold, player 2,
learns outcome 1. As player 1 takes action 2, the payo® that player 2 receives from using
action 1 decreases. As a result, player 2 also learns to take action 2 to get a higher payo®.
Once both the players learn the Nash equilibrium outcome, they do not deviate from it.
However, because the Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto dominated, the payo®s of both
the players are lower.
Note also that when one of the players has a low k, the player with a high k also learns
the Nash equilibrium outcome much more often (see the bottom panel of the ¯gure). In
addition, when a is smaller, the payo® di®erence between the player with a low k and the
player with a high k is larger. See the appendix for more discussion.
4 An Account for the Simulation Results
Why can a partial understanding of the game structure bene¯t players in the focal game,
and why do behaviors of players remain such that their understanding of the game remains
partial? In this section, we provide an explanation through a highly simpli¯ed analysis of
the case where players have an identical short-term memory length and cognition thresh-
old.
In our simulation, the model always seems to reach a steady state where probabilities
with which players choose their actions do not vary over time (at least, if we take averages
over several realizations). Here we restrict our analysis to such an average steady state.
Because the game in this paper is symmetric and the players have identical characteristics
(i.e., mi, ki, and ¸i are all the same across players), we focus on a symmetric steady state.
More rigorous and exact analysis is needed to understand fully the behavior of the model,
but the simpli¯ed analysis below can explain the main result in our simulation analysis,
namely, why partial understanding of a game can bene¯t players and why behaviors of
players remain such that their understandings of the game remain partial.
Let us start with considering the learning based only on the realized payo®s (RL
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model). The expected steady-state level of attractions, Ais, for action s in this case is:
Ais = p
i
s
³
pj1¼(a
i
s; a
j
1) + p
j
2¼(a
i
s; a
j
2) + p
j
3¼(a
i
s; a
j
3)
´
; (5)
where pis and p
j
s are player i's and j's probabilities for choosing action s, respectively,
when t!1 in equation (2).
This is because, in this model, an action will not receive the stimulus unless it is
actually chosen, and when it is chosen, the expected value of the stimulus that the action
receives depends on the probabilities with which the opponent is choosing the actions.
Note that pjs =
exp(¸Ajs)P3
k=1 exp(¸A
j
k)
. Because, in the symmetric steady state, Ais = A
j
s(´ ARLs )
for s 2 f1; 2; 3g, the expected levels of steady-state attractions for the RL model (ARLs )
become:
ARL1 = p
RL
1 (p
RL
1 (1¡ a) + pRL3 );
ARL2 = p
RL
2 (p
RL
1 + p
RL
2 a+ p
RL
3 a);
ARL3 = p
RL
3 (p
RL
1 + p
RL
3 (1¡ a));
where pRLs =
exp(¸ARLs )P3
k=1 exp(¸A
RL
k )
for each action s in the game. Here we have ignored b added to
the payo®s for clarity of exposition. Solving these equations for ARL1 , A
RL
2 , and A
RL
3 gives
us the expected levels of attractions for each action in the steady state, and the expected
probabilities that players choose each action in the steady state follows immediately.15
In our model of game learning, players' understanding of the game plays a role in
determining the expected steady-state attractions. For example, if the payo® associated
with (si1; s
j
1) is the unique long-term memory in players' minds, then the steady-state
attractions of our model (AGLs ) become:
AGL1 = p
GL
1 (1¡ a) + pGL1 pGL3 ;
AGL2 = p
GL
2 (p
GL
1 + p
GL
2 a+ p
GL
3 a);
AGL3 = p
GL
3 (p
GL
1 + p
GL
3 (1¡ a)):
15It is possible that there are multiple steady states.
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This is because action 1 will receive stimulus not only when outcomes (si1; s
j
1), (s
i
1; s
j
2), and
(si1; s
j
3) are realized but also every time the opponent chooses action 1. One can expect
from these equations that when players only learn of the payo®s associated with (si1; s
j
1),
action 1 will have a higher steady-state attraction than the RL model and will be chosen
with a higher probability by players. As a result, (si1; s
j
1) will be observed much more
frequently in our model than in the case of the RL model, and because players choose
other actions with a low probability, other outcomes are not realized frequently enough.
Therefore, their understanding of the game remains partial.
On the other hand, if players quickly learn the entire game, as in the k = 1 case, the
steady-state attractions of our model immediately become equivalent to those of learning
based on both realized and forgone payo®s (FP model). The expected attraction for action
s in the FP model is given by:
Ais = p
j
1¼(a
i
s; a
j
1) + p
j
2¼(a
i
s; a
j
2) + p
j
3¼(a
i
s; a
j
3): (6)
This is because all the actions will always receive stimulus regardless of whether they have
been chosen or not. Therefore, the expected levels of steady-state attractions in the FP
model (AFPs ) become:
AFP1 = p
FP
1 (1¡ a) + pFP3 ;
AFP2 = p
FP
1 + p
FP
2 a+ p
FP
3 a;
AFP3 = p
FP
1 + p
FP
3 (1¡ a);
for the game when we ignore the b added to the payo®s. These expressions give the
largest weight to choosing action 2 for both of the players. Therefore, compared with the
RL model, the FP model results in players obtaining lower payo®s.
5 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a model of learning about a game. Players initially have
little knowledge about the game they play. They gain experience through playing the
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game repeatedly, and based on their experience, they not only learn which action will
bring about a higher payo® but also form their view about the game they are playing. We
show that, in the 3£3 game we have considered, which embeds both a prisoner's dilemma
and a coordination game, players may bene¯t from having a very limited understanding
of the game when all the players have such a limited understanding. Their payo®s can be
higher than the cases where players have full or no understanding of the game. It should be
noted that personal views and behaviors of players coevolve in our model. Because players
enjoy a high payo®, their understanding of the game remains partial and vice versa. This
result suggests that players may live happily without fully understanding highly complex
strategic environments.
When one of the players has a much better understanding of the game than the other,
the one with the better understanding can enjoy a higher payo® than the one with less
understanding. However, their payo®s|even the payo®s of the player who better un-
derstands the game|can be lower than in the case where all the players have a limited
understanding. The behavior of the player who better understands the game can lead the
other player to respond in a way that lowers their payo®s. This, combined with the results
above, suggests that a bene¯t of ignorance may exist, but it exists only when everyone is
ignorant.
In this paper, we have considered a pair of players playing the game repeatedly. How-
ever, one can easily extend the framework presented here to the case where there are many
players to be matched with a few others. In such a case, it is possible to consider various
matching protocols: for example, players may be situated in a network and interact only
locally. The results here suggest that it is possible that players may form several di®erent
\local views" of the same objective game. What will happen when there is occasional
random matching among those with di®erent views? Are there views that can spread
much more easily than others? These are all interesting questions to investigate, but we
will leave them for future research.
It is also interesting to conduct laboratory experiments and examine how subjects
learn in the situation considered in this paper; namely, subjects are initially only informed
about the set of actions available to themselves, but they observe actions chosen by all
21
the relevant players and the payo® received after each interaction. Do subjects behave in
the way that the model predicts? We also leave these questions for future research.
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A Dependency of the Results on Parameter Values
In the main text, we presented results under m1 = m2 = 5, a = 0:25, ¸ = 5:0. Here we
show what happens to the results if we change the parameter values.
Figures 5 and 6 show the results for the case where a = 0:05 and a = 0:45, respectively,
in the same format as Figure 2. As in the case discussed in the main text, when k = 1,
GL players quickly learn all the outcomes, and their behaviors converge to that of FP
players. When a = 0:45, there is not much di®erence in behavior among the GL, FP,
and RL players. It is also the case that among GL players, the di®erences in cognition
threshold k do not a®ect their behavior signi¯cantly. In all the models, players learn to
play the Nash equilibrium, and they learn the payo® associated with the Nash equilibrium
outcome almost all the time.
In these two ¯gures, the GL players do not receive higher payo®s than FP or RL
players, contrary to what we have shown in the main text and Figure 2. What is the
range of a over which our main result holds? How about the range of ¸? Figure 7 shows
the average payo® of players for various values of a holding ¸ constant at ¸ = 5:0 (top)
as well as various values of ¸ while holding a constant at a = 0:25. One can see that the
GL players receive higher payo®s than FP and RL players over quite a large parameter
space, in particular, 0:1 · a · 0:35 when ¸ = 5:0 and 3:0 · ¸ · 6:0 for a = 0:25. In
fact, we have experimented with other values of m, and qualitatively the same results can
be obtained: as k becomes closer to m, the GL players receive high payo®s while their
understanding of the game remains very limited, although the speci¯c values of a and ¸
for which such a result holds depend on m.
We have seen that when players have the same short-term memory length but di®erent
cognition thresholds, the player with a low cognition threshold (the one who learns the
game quickly) receives a higher payo® than the one with a high cognition threshold. The
di®erence between the payo®s received by the two players is larger when the di®erence
between the two thresholds is large and also when a is low.
Figure 8 shows the results for simulation runs when m1 = m2 = 5, ¸ = 5:0 and
a = 0:05. As one can see, the lower is k1, the larger is the payo® di®erence between
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Average Status of Long-Term Memories at t = 500
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Figure 5: Average payo® of the row-player over time (top), average frequencies of realized
outcomes (middle), and average status of long-term memories (bottom) for various k.
m = 5, a = 0:05, ¸ = 5:0. For the average payo®, the result of our model is in solid black,
the solid gray represents the RL model, and the dashed gray represents the FP model.
For the average status in the long-term memory, the darker gray corresponds to the higher
likelihood that the outcome is kept as a long-term memory, which is also shown by the
height of bars.
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Average Status of Long-Term Memories at t = 500
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Figure 6: Average payo® of the row-player over time (top), average frequencies of realized
outcomes (middle), and average status of long-term memories (bottom) for various k.
m = 5, a = 0:45, ¸ = 5:0. For the average payo®, the result of our model is in solid black,
the solid gray represents the RL model, and the dashed gray represents the FP model.
For the average status in the long-term memory, the darker gray corresponds to the higher
likelihood that the outcome is kept as a long-term memory. The same information is also
shown by the height of bars.
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Average Payo® of the row-player over time for various values of a
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Figure 7: Average payo® of the row-player over time for various a (top) and for various
values of ¸ (bottom). m = 5, k = 5, ¸ = 5:0 (top) and a = 0:25 (bottom). For the average
payo®, the result of our model is in solid black, the solid gray represents RL model, and
the dashed gray represents FP model.
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the two players. Furthermore, compared with what was shown in Figure 4, the payo®
di®erences between the two players are larger here.
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Figure 8: Average payo® of the row-player over time (top), average frequencies of realized
outcomes (middle), and average status of long-term memories (bottom) for three values of
k1. m1 = m2 = 5, k2 = 5, a = 0:05, ¸ = 5:0. In the top panel, the average payo® of player
1 (low cognitive threshold) is in solid line, while that of player 2 (high cognitive threshold)
is in the dashed line. For the average status of the long-term memories, the darker gray
corresponds to the higher likelihood that the outcome is recorded as a long-term memory.
The same information is also shown by the height of bars.
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